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IN THE SUPREt1E COURT OF THE STl\TE OF U'l'l\H

'~RJORIE

f

WINTERS,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 15523

vs.
CHl\RLES ANTHONY, INC. ,
a Utah corporation,
Defendant-l\ppellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE Cl\SE

This is an action to recover the value of jewelry bailed to the
defendant-appellant for the purpose of alteration.

After the

alterations were completed the jewelry was either lost or stolen througl
the negligence of the appellant and has not been delivered to the
respondent.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The action was tried on September 29, 1977 before the Honorable
Marcellus K. Snow, sitting without a jury.

On October 18, 1977,

judgment was entered in favor of respondent in the amount of eight
thousand one hundred and eighty dollars ($8,180.00), together with
interest and costs.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
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Appellant does not dispute the conclusion of the trial court

that appellant is liable to the respondent for the value of the
jewelry under a contract of bailment.

Appellant claims only that

the trial court's damage award was excessive.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 23, 1976, respondent delivered to appellant's jewel:
store in Trolley Square a bracelet given to her by her
following her sister's death.

The bracelet was of gold

and was set with 63 emeralds and 54 pearls.

brother-~~
manufach~

Respondent requested :I

appellant to convert the bracelet into a cross to be worn as a penci
or pin.
On ahout April 15, 1976, after the altetations had been
completed, appellant delivered the cross to H. J. Vander Veer, a
well known Salt Lake City jewelry appraiser, to be appraised.
vanC:er Veer, who had also seen the jewelry prior to the al terationo,
examined the cross and rendered an appraisal concluding that

t~ ~

contained 63 emeralds weighing a total of 18. 9 carats and 54 half
pearls which,

together with the setting, had a total retail market

value of $8,180.00.
When respondent returned to appellant's store in June, 1976 ~
pick up the cross and complete payment for the alterations, she wa;
informed that the cross had been returned by Vander Veer, but was
missing.

The pendant was stolen or lost through the negligence of

the appellant and has not been delivered to the respondent.
The trial court held that the market value of the cross at

trt

time of the loss was $8,180.00 and entered judgment in favor of thi
respondent in that amount, plus interest and costs.

Appellant no',:

- 2 -
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I

app~als

claiming that the trial court's damage award is excessive.
l\RGDr1EnT POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE APPROPRIATE MEASURE
OF DAMAGES IS THE Ml\RKET, OR REPLI\CEMENT, Vl\LUE OF THE JEWELRY
AT THE TIME IT Wl\S LOS'l' AND A\vARDED THAT !\MOUNT TO RESPONDENT.
Respondent does not dispute, and the trial court held, that the
correct measure of damages in this case is the market, or replacement,
value of the jewelry at the time it was lost through the negligence
of the appellant.

Clack-Nomah Flying Club v. Sterling Aircraft, Inc.,

Company, 121 U. 339, 241 P.2d, 914

(1952).

The principle issue before this court is not whether the trial
court should have adopted market value as the measure of damages, but
whether the damage award was in excess of market value.

In reviewing

the award this court is governed by the following well-established
principles set forth in Brown v. Board of Education of the Morgan
County School District, 560 P.2d, 1129, 1131 (Utah 1977), quoting from
Hardy v. Hendrickson, 27 U.2d 251, 495 P.2d 28, 29 (1972):
On appeal the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable
to sustain the lower court, and the findings will not be
disturbed unless they are clearly against the weight of the
evidence or it manifestly appears that the court misapplied
the law to the established facts.
Likewise, this court held in Hanover Ltd. v. Fields, 568 P.2d
751, 753 (Utah 1977), that the trial court's findings shall not be
disturbed ".

. unless the evidence is such that all reasonable

minds would be persuaded to the contrary."

Furthermore, it was held

in Barlow Upholstery Furniture Company v. Emmel, 533 P.2d 900, 902
(Utah 1975) that where a finding of fact .

.finds any reasonable

support in the evidence it will not be disturbed on appeal. See also,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Ewell and Son,
1283

Inc. v. Salt Lake Cit_z__C_OE!:J.OE'.:!!:i()_!:l_,

27 U.2d 188,

~

(1972).
There is ample evidence in the record in this case to supx

the trial court's finding that the market value and replacement v
of the jewelry at the time it was lost was $8,180.00.

H•

J. Vandc.

the professional appraiser to whom appellant elected to take the
bracelet for appraisal following its reconstruction into a

cross~

customarily appraised jewelry for the appellant, testified that he,
rendered a formal appraisal involving,
of the weight, dimensions,

inter alia,

the measurement

specific gravity and indices of

of the stones mounted on the cross

(T. 20-23).

refr~t"l

The appraisal cone:

that the cross contained 6 3 gem-quality Muzo emeralds having a tot

I

weight of 18.9 carats and valued on the retail market at $400.00[1
carat

(T. 12, 19-21)

at $5.00 each.

and 54 half-pearls valued on the retail market

Vander Veer testified that the retail market valucj

I

the whole piece was $8,180.00

(T.11) with a standard margin of err;~

of between 20 and 25 per cent

(T.10).

Vander Veer acknowledged th:,

the wholesale price for the individual emeralds in the piece was
approximately $200.00, and reaffirmed that his appraisal "is
(T. 12) .

Vander Veer explained why

he appraised the cross at retail value,

rather than wholesale value

characterized as retail price"

as follows at pages 12-13 of the trial transcript:
Because an appraisal, when i t is prepared, is, usually, fot
an insurance company or for the party that wants to know di::
their item is worth.
If it is used for the insurance puroo':,
the insurance company would pay them as to their replacement
value of the item, which would be the normal retail value;
not the wholesale price."

-

4 -
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Vander Veer teslified that the purpose of an appraisal is to place

a retail value on an item (T.18); that he never appraises jewelry as
to its who]csale value, but only as to its retail value; and that the
retail value of the cross, as well as other jewelry he appraises, is
arrived at Ly "keystoninq", or doubling, the wholesale price

(T. 13-14).

Ile stated that in his opinion the keystone figure, or marked-up value,
represents the retail value of the cross (T. 17).

He also stated

that his appraisal did not take into account any so-called esthetic
value or appearance (T.19) and that his appraisal reflected the average
wholesale price of dealers throughout the country (T. 21).

Vander Veer

testified that there is no more certain way of establishing the value
of a piece of jewelry than by appraisal by a competent appraiser
(T. 23)

and that although a dealer might sell an item above or below

market value, appraised value means market value (T. 25-26).

In fact,

dealers differ so much in their approach to marketing that it is
"almost impossible" to arrive at a retail value except by an appraisal
which takes into account wholesale prices across the country (T. 17).
Vander Veer also said he would insure the cross at the figure in his
appraisal if he were insuring it for his wife or valuing it as part
of an estate (T. 24).
The conclusions of the expert appraiser were disputed by the
appellant only through the testimony of Barry Nash, an employee of
the appellant, who said that he "probably" could buy similar stones
and compose a similar piece for between three and four thousand
dollars and "probably" would be willing to sell it for approximately
five thousand dollars

(T. 36).

However, Nash admitted that he was not

qualified to appraise precious stones

(T. 38-39); that he did not
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1

attempt to appraise the jewelry in question, either before or af•
it had been altered

(T.

39);

that it was he who selected Vandcr,

to appraise the jewelry so that the appellant would know what it
was worth

("[I]

the piece"

(T.

had it done becouse of some interest in the value
37);

and that it is an appraiser's joh to perfom

tests on stones to determine their quality and, based on

experi~

and knowledge of the market, establish a fair retail selling price,
('1'.

43-44).

And, although Nash testified that he would not keyst:I

the jewelry in question and that he thought it would be difficult
to get more than $5,000.00 for it in Salt Lake City, he could note/

uJ

that another jeweler in Salt Lake City would not keystone it or
i t wouldn't bring more than $5,000.00 elsewhere
whether he meant to represent that 0. C. Tanner,
Jeweler,

(T.

45).

I

1\hen a5 I

another Salt Lal··

is not keystoning $4,000.00 items, Nash replied:

"I didn't say that.
is not." (T. 47)

I

said,

I

would guess he, probably,

Nash's testimony was equivocal, self-serving and lacking in
foundation as to expertise.

The testimony of Vander Veer, appclkj

own choice as appraiser, \vas, by comparison, unequivocal, credit!.:
based upon unquestioned professional expertise and provided

t~

court ample reasonable evidence in support of the award of $8,
the market, or replacement, value.

t·:

180.~

Surely it cannot be said that

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the lower co'
findings the damage award is "clearly against the weight of the
evidence."

Brown v. Board of Education of Morgan County School

supra at 1131.

Nor can it be saic1 that "the evidence is such tf,:·

all rC'asonable minds would be persuaded to the contrary."
Ltd., v. Fields

r·

s~~

!lcino•·,

at 753.
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Appellant seems to infer that by replacement value, whicl.

-

6 -

1

'~'"qooSL'c:

v:iluc',

of tl1is uppc;\l hoth p,irl

ic~3

a<Jrcc is synonymous with market

rncuns the cost Lo the iJtJpcllant of purchi1sinc1 stones at less

LJ1,rn wholc;;alc prices, munufacturincr a sirniLn piece of jewelry and
milrkinCj it up by un ,:imount arbitrdrily fixed by the appellant.
ilowever, it is clear that replacement value means the amount it would'*
cost

responde~

to replace the property.

Furthermore, appellant's

argument ignores the testimony of appellant's own witness, Mr. Nash,
who testified that most jewelers determine for themselves what kind
of profit margin they need on the sale of a piece and that "that margin
v:oulcl vary, tremendously"

(T. 29,34).

why an appraisal is performed.

That variation is the very reason

In the words of Mr. Nash,

"The ob-

jective of an appraisal would be to reflect what the value of an item
would be, if it was to be sold in a jewelry store, or replaced for
insurance purposes.

. an appraisal [is] done to establish a retail

price.

As Nash stated, the value assigned by the

(T. 34).

appraiser"

.should represent the average of what it would cost

to replace the piece"

(T. 33)

This is precisely what the expert

appraiser, H. J. Vander Veer, did in this case (T. 16).

And this is

why insurance companies rely upon appraisals to fix the replacement
value of an item on which compensation is to be made (T. 12).

Thus

the testimony of appellant's own witness helped to demonstrate that
in this case the appraisal value is the replacement value, which is
the market value.
Indeed, rather than excessive, Vander Veer's appraisal was
probably on the short side.

He testified that his appraisal did not

tilke into account the je1·.'eler's"

.overhead, his personnel, his

fixccl costs, his profit margin, ;md all that.
- 7 -

(T.

18).
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Appellant hu.s also mu.clc the bald iJ.s,;crtion that

"rocc)\'~r

be limited to the SiJ.lt LiJ.kc City retail jch·elry market" withoul
providing any authority for thu.t proposition.
Stoll v. Almon

c.

The law is contrar

,Judd Co., 106 Conn. 551, 1381\. 479,

483 ( 1927)'

cited by appellant at page 9 of its brief, makes it clear that the
~

I

value to be recovered is the "

.value in the market open to tt:

plaintiff at the time of loss. "

'I'here is nothing in the law or ir,

1

~

the record to limit the market open to respondent in this case
Salt Lake City alone.

I

Such a limitation would be inappropriate

in the case of jewelry, which can be easily moved from place to
place for sale

(T. 45, 46).

The mL!rket open to respondent extendec I

at least to cities elsewhere around the country.

Vander Veer

1·1as

familiar with prices elsewhere (T. 16,21), whereas there is no
indication in the record that Nash possessed such knowledqe (T. C'.,I
45).

Vander Veer stated that his appraisal reflected wholesale

~1

in Salt Lake City or elsewhere (T.12).
The trier of fact has wide discretion as to the amount of
damages awarded and an award will not be set aside as a matter
unless grossly and manifestly excessive.
2d 1284, 1287 (Utah 1973); Ward
1972).

o'i

Amoss v. Broadbent, 514 !

~Enevold,

I

504 P. 2d 1111,1114

1c1

In the instant case the trial court's award had substantic.I

support in the record and was not excessive .
THE APPRAISER'S TESTIMONY ON THE Ml\RKET VALUE OF THE JE\'iEL'
HAD SUFFICIENT FOUNDATION.
Appellant has challenged the qualifications of its own
appraiser claiming that rlr. Vander Veer' s testimony as to the val.[
of the jewelry was received without prooer foundation regardin~
-

8 -
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his e:·:1•crlisc in lhc

~:alt

Leibe;

City r.·tail jeHelry market.

It should be noted that no objection was made by appellant at
uial

reqcirclinq the expert's qualificiltions as an appraiser.

1·

Indeed,

it was appellant who selected this expert and submitted the jewelry
to him in order to,
Nash,

11
•

in the words of appellant's employee and witness

.establish a retail price.

had a sufficient founclcttion.

Vander Veer's testimony

Ile testi fiecl that as of the time of the

trial he had bc>en appraising jewelry for "
tho [Salt Lake City]

areil.

.quite a few stores in

. for six or seven years"

(T. 9).

He

testified in detail concerning the method which he followed in
appraising the stones in question (T. 11-12, 19-23), and stated
repeatedly that all of his appraisals are rendered in terms of
retail market values

(T. 12,15,25).

himself a dealer in emeralds
into account ".

Vander Veer stated that he is

(T. 12) and in rendering appraisals takes

.the value which is placed on stones by the Retail

Jewelers Association, and groups at the Gemological Institute, in
the material which they put out, which more or less, grades stones as
to the color, the clarity, and the cut"

(T.

16).

Mr. Vander Veer was qualified as an expert appraiser with
substantial knowledge and expertise in appraising the retail market
value of precious stones in the Salt Lake City area or any area.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT AWARDED RESPONDENT THE Ar10UN'l' REQUIRED TO
RESTORE HER TO HER POSITION AT THE TIME OF THE LOSS.
At Point IV of the appellant's brief appellant seems to argue
that since the jewelry in question was a gjft to the respondent, an
award of any dama0es to her for the loss of the jewelry would
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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constitute a windfall.

It is well settled that the fundamental

principle of damages for the loss of bailed property "

. is tor

the injured party to the position he would have been in had it not
been for the wrong of the other pL1rty."
Company,

supra at 920.

Park v. Moorman Manufactc

Regardless of how respondent acquired the

jewelry, she unquestionably was the O\·mer at the time of the loss.
was damaged in the full amount of the market value of the jewelry
at that time.

The trial court's award was consistent with the pre:

of market value and in no respect is a windfall profit to the
respondent.
CONCLUSION
The weight of the evidence supported the trial court's finrfo1
that the market value of the jewelry at the time of this loss was

$8,180.00.

The trial court properly awarded respondent that

amoo~

in order to restore her to the position she would have been in ha;
i t not been for the wrongful loss of the jewelry by the

appell~t.

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respon:!
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